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Culture and Conduct Risk Management
Stephen Scott
INTRODUCTION
This Article offers a tour of a small portion of the literature that I
have found particularly helpful in thinking about the importance of trust
in society, about the hollowing-out of trust in our core social institutions
since the Financial Crisis, and about what this means for business.
Our survival as a species has hinged on an ability to cooperate with
trusted others. Our thriving as a species has come as a consequence of our
ability to collaborate with strangers, at scale, as a presumed behavioral
norm. This is a recent phenomenon, made possible by the creation of a
purpose-built institutional “trust infrastructure.” Without that to bind us,
the very basis of shared peace and prosperity is lost. The collapse of trust
in our core social institutions is therefore, in my view, the single greatest
challenge of our day.
With some focus on the banking sector, I will argue that a failure of
risk governance lies behind this collapse in trust, and I will offer some
suggestions as to how we might do better. While by design a philosophical
inquiry and exploration, this Article has a practical goal: to challenge
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precepts of modern management science; to put forth alternative theories;
and to suggest that there is need—and opportunity—to establish a new
paradigm for the management of risks that flow from company culture and
the conduct that it promotes.
Ultimately, this is an Article about human behavior, its causes and
consequences. A subject so vast does not confine itself to any one, narrow,
academic swim-lane and neither do I. Rather, I have afforded myself the
luxury of borrowing liberally from a range of disciplines and their
associated literatures, seeking to weave a coherent narrative that allows us
to ask “what are we to do?” and to posit an approach to identifying
responsive ideas that at least warrant some consideration.
The Article is in three Parts: Zeitgeist, Weltanschauung, and Gestalt.
In the first Part, Zeitgeist,1 I reflect on the spirit of our times, characterized
by a contest between Forces of Connection and Forces of Division. Too
often we tend to think of ourselves and our institutions in an atomistic
manner; we fail to recognize that we are all connected in social
ecosystems. We see this in the framing of the current corporate governance
debate regarding the primacy of shareholder interests versus those of
stakeholders, which is merely the most recent manifestation of a
decades-long debate on this topic. The terms of this debate, I shall argue,
reflect a persistent failure of philosophical imagination when it comes to
apprehending the nature of the firm as a social ecosystem.
In the next Part, Weltanschauung,2 I argue for a different worldview;
one that asks after not only who and what the firm is for, but one that
considers anew what the firm actually is. I characterize it as a nexus of
trust relations and argue that the robust attention to the importance of trust
that we have seen in the macro-economic context needs to be matched by
a study of its significance at the micro-economic level of the individual
firm or organization. Inextricably bound up in this argument is an
appreciation of our history as a cooperative species—one that thrives due
to its unique ability to create shared networks of collective intelligence
among trusted peers—as I shall discuss in some depth.
The closing Part, Gestalt,3 argues for bringing a holistic appreciation
of the foregoing to our study of business management, particularly to
management of the non-financial risks with which any organization must
contend, and most especially those that are referred to as “culture and
conduct risks.” I will argue that a failure to manage such risks successfully
is among the principal causes of our current “Trust Crisis.” And I will note
that this, in turn, stems from a failure to apprehend fully the social nature
1. Infra Part I.
2. Infra Part II.
3. Infra Part III.
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of the human animal, and the way in which our social lives shape our
identities and determine the norms of behavior to which we feel compelled
to conform.
I conclude the Article by arguing that those who are responsible for
managing behavioral risk within organizations must begin by recognizing
a “coercive competition” that shapes the parameters of their task.
Employee conduct—or misconduct—is derived from a combination of
formal mechanisms, such as incentive schemes and “tone from the top,”
and far more powerful informal mechanisms, such as peer norms. While
these mechanisms may work in concert to induce certain behaviors, it is
perhaps more often so that they work in opposition, leaving employees
pulled in different directions. I shall briefly discuss new capabilities in the
field of computational social science that make possible an examination of
this complex interplay of formal and informal coercive systems, thus
providing a powerful new means by which to manage organizations. In
time, the application of such tools to the management of culture and
conduct-related risks may help restore trustworthiness to our institutions
and help to free us from the Distrust Trap.
It should be noted that I am not a lawyer, economist, organizational
psychologist, nor an academic of any pedigree. I am just a guy who reads
a lot and who is trying to make a difference. If this Article stimulates any
reactions from those who may truly be called “scholar,” I shall consider it
a success.
I. ZEITGEIST
A. The Freak of the Universe
Homo sapiens likes to believe that it is different, special, better,
other. We are wrong in this but perhaps understandably so. For if there is
anything truly distinct about the human animal, then surely it lies in our
capacity for narrative—–and especially for that of the inward sort: the
stories we tell ourselves about ourselves, about one another, about our
world, and about our place within it.
It is central to these inner-dramas and psycho-dynamic myths that we
are, each of us, doomed to play the part of the protagonist. In that role, we
most often see our-selfs as separate and distinct, rather than forming a part
of some consequential whole. This self-absorption lies not just within our
nature but may be the very essence of it: as that genius observer Erich
Fromm put it, “Man is the only animal for whom his own existence is a
problem which he has to solve and from which he cannot escape.”4 Fromm
4. ERICH FROMM, MAN FOR HIMSELF: AN INQUIRY INTO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS 40 (1947).
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traces this to the development of reason, which resulted in what he calls
an “historical dichotomy”:
Self-awareness, reason and imagination have disrupted the
“harmony” which characterizes animal existence. Their emergence
has made man into an anomaly, into the freak of the universe. He is
a part of nature, subject to her physical laws and unable to change
them, yet he transcends the rest of nature. He is set apart while being
a part . . . .5

Our error is to emphasize Fromm’s “set apart-ness” over his “being
a part-ness.” We give primacy to the individual self over all of its brethren,
over the natural world from which each and all emerge, and within which
all of our narrative-selfs are set and made possible. Instead, the human
animal must be considered against all other social animals—the ants, bees,
dolphins, wolves, horses, elephants, some birds, other primates (of
course), and more. Like them, we emerge from and exist within
fundamentally social ecosystems, outside of which we are most likely to
perish.6
This is not idle philosophizing. Fromm’s existential dilemma is at the
very center of current civic, political, and economic crises and debates.
Journalist David Brooks describes this struggle in terms of a “New Cold
War,” one between the Forces of Connection and the Forces of Division.7
He chronicles an “epidemic” of alienation, loneliness, and distrust that has
left our social fabric in tatters. “The chief struggle of the day,” he writes,
“is sociological and psychological, not ideological or economic.”8 He then
adds this crucial observation: “The substrate layer of American society—
the network of relationships and connection and trust that everything else
relies upon—is failing. And the results are as bloody as any war.”9
Business is a social endeavor, so no meaningful discussion of
corporate governance can be divorced from these broader themes of
connection and division. I take them, therefore, as my starting point and
carry these ideas throughout the following Article, which considers them
in connection with their implications for business management, allowing

5. Id. (emphasis added).
6. Daniel Christian Wahl, Life’s Economy is Primarily Based on Collaborative Rather Than
Competitive Advantage, MEDIUM (Feb. 1, 2017), https://medium.com/age-of-awareness/lifeseconomy-is-primarily-based-on-collaborative-rather-than-competitive-advantage-e7c5f55466fd
[https://perma.cc/8EPZ-8UNT].
7. David Brooks, The New Cold War: The Forces of Division and the Forces of Connection,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/29/opinion/pittsburgh-shootingisolation-depression.html?auth=login-email&login=email [https://perma.cc/H2UN-6GD4].
8. Id.
9. Id. (emphasis added).
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me to conclude with a suggested new paradigm for culture and conduct
risk management.
B. We Are Not Alone
Across the globe, business leaders appear newly alive to the idea that
we are social creatures who thrive (or fail to) within “social-ecological
systems”10 or “shared communities of fate.”11 Increasingly, the “set apartness” of a given firm is seen as subsidiary to the “being a part-ness” of the
social ecology within which these “artificial persons” reside and upon
which they depend.
Blackrock’s Larry Fink is credited with advancing the current tone
in his January 2018 annual letter to the boards of the world’s largest
companies, in which he argued, “To prosper over time, every company
must not only deliver financial performance, but also show how it makes
a positive contribution to society.”12 Those failing in this, he warned, “will
ultimately lose the license to operate from key stakeholders.”13
Fink doubled down in his 2019 letter. Observing that we are in the
midst of the largest wealth transfer in history—$24 trillion from baby
boomers to millennials—he notes that the younger generation has different
investment preferences than the older and places greater emphasis on
environmental, social, and governance issues (ESG) that will be
“increasingly material to corporate valuations.”14 Fink ties his assertions
here to a remarkably communal view of corporate purpose: “Purpose
unifies management, employees, and communities. It drives ethical
behavior and creates an essential check on actions that go against the best
interests of stakeholders. Purpose guides culture, provides a framework for
consistent decision-making, and, ultimately, helps sustain long-term
financial returns for the shareholders of your company.”15
Fink gives corporate purpose force. He argues not only that purpose
establishes the pre-conditions for effective corporate governance but, by
inference, he asserts that only those management decisions and actions that
10. See Stockholm Resilience Centre TV, Understanding Social-Ecological Systems, YOUTUBE
(Nov. 26, 2017), https://youtu.be/1WrMK-cqmkc [https://perma.cc/9K7N-DYTW].
11. Noah Elbot, An Expanded Community of Fate: Senior Fellow Margaret Levi on Unions and
Political Action, WATSON INST. INT’L & PUB. AFFAIRS, https://watson.brown.edu/news/explore/2013
/levi [https://perma.cc/8L7T-AWUP].
12. Andrew Ross Sorkin, BlackRock’s Message: Contribute to Society, or Risk Losing Our
Support, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/business/deal
book/blackrock-laurence-fink-letter.html [https://perma.cc/P2SL-BLWU].
13. Id.
14. Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2019 Letter to CEOs: Purpose & Profit, BLACKROCK (2019),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter (last visited Jan. 28,
2020).
15. Id.
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are consistent with a firm’s purpose will advance the interests of its
shareholders sustainably—and thus, will necessarily also advance the
interests of its broader stakeholder communities. Corporate purpose, in
other words, articulates and enlivens the firm’s ecological “being a partness.”
Few have taken up this theme as passionately and thoughtfully as
Oxford’s Colin Mayer, who criticizes past economic orthodoxy for its
failure to fully apprehend that which most enhances human well-being. “It
focuses on individualism when the purpose of life derives from
community,” Mayer writes.16 Through his Future of the Corporation
program, hosted by the British Academy, Mayer is working to foment and
to facilitate a “paradigm shift” in how the firm is conceived and
governed.17 He puts corporate purpose at center: “[a] company’s
governance is indeterminate so long as its purposes are undefined.”18
Fink’s exhortations and Mayer’s activism reflect our Zeitgeist, which
was given its most recent expression by the Business Roundtable (BRT),
an association of the CEOs at America’s most prominent firms. In its
recently-issued Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation19—a
“modernizing” update to its 1997 Principals of Corporate Governance—
the BRT refutes the so-called Friedman Doctrine, which holds that “there
is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources
and engage in activities designed to increase its profits.”20
Consistent with Friedman, the BRT had previously maintained that
“[t]he paramount duty of management and of boards of directors is to the
corporation’s stockholders,” and that “interests of other stakeholders are
relevant as a derivative of the duty to stockholders.”21 Its new Statement
overturns decades of such “shareholder primacy” orthodoxy to assert a
“multi-stakeholder model” of corporate purpose, one that commits
member firms to work towards “creating value for customers, investing in
employees, fostering diversity and inclusion, dealing fairly with suppliers,
16. COLIN MAYER, PROSPERITY: BETTER BUSINESS MAKES THE GREATER GOOD 11 (2018).
17. About Future of the Corporation, BRITISH ACAD., https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/
programmes/future-of-the-corporation/about [https://perma.cc/HCV7-8GBJ]. Full disclosure: I am
delighted to have been invited to play a small part in the deliberations of the community of thinkers
that Professor Mayer has curated.
18. MAYER, supra note 16, at 19.
19. Our Commitment: Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, BUS. ROUNDTABLE,
https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/ourcommitment/ [https://perma.cc/EJN3-3DS3].
20. Milton Friedman, A Friedman doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase
its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32.
21. Peter Gasca, In This Single Statement, CEOs From the Largest U.S. Corporations Just
Changed the Purpose of Business, INC. (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.inc.com/peter-gasca/in-thissingle-statement-ceos-from-largest-us-corporations-just-changed-purpose-of-business.html [https://
perma.cc/AF8D-QMJ3].

2020]

Coercive Competition

771

supporting communities, and protecting the environment.”22 Notably, it
makes reference to all these purposes before even mentioning
shareholders.23
The backlash to BRT’s statement was as immediate as it must have
been expected: unnecessary; fool-hardy; disingenuous; petty posturing
driven by political calculus. “Accountability to everyone means
accountability to no one,” the Council of Institutional Investors fretted.24
Though the Council accepted that it is “critical to respect stakeholders,” it
warned that business leaders must have “clear accountability to company
owners.”25
C. Once More, with Feeling
The debate will no doubt continue, but there is little here that is new.
Rather, this current contest should be seen as a continuation of that Great
Debate of the early 1930s, between Adolf A. Berle and E. Merrick Dodd,
conducted amidst the Great Depression and ultimately forming the
intellectual backdrop against which modern securities law took shape.
In what has since been cast as arguing for shareholder-primacy, in
1931 Berle wrote that managerial authority is “necessarily and at all times
exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all shareholders as their interest
appears.”26 Dodd’s 1932 rejoinder effectively argued that, once given the
status of legal personhood, a firm is no longer a mere aggregation of
shareholders but must be seen as enjoying what is, in effect, a civic life
with attendant civic duties. Thus, the case for stakeholder-primacy: the
firm is “an economic institution which has a social service as well as a
profit-making function,” Dodd concludes.27
As others have pointed out, the two men had more in common than
the nuanced views that separated them.28 But at a time when policy-makers
were concerned with restoring confidence in markets among the investing
public, fluttering like two moths around a shared flame, Berle and Dodd
22. Our Commitment: Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 19.
23. See Michael Spence, The End of Shareholder Primacy?, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Aug. 26,
2019), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/shareholder-vs-multi-stakeholder-model-bymichael-spence-2019-08 [https://perma.cc/9MHG-9A6Y].
24. Council of Institutional Investors Responds to Business Roundtable Statement on Corporate
Purpose, COUNCIL OF INST. INV. (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.cii.org/aug19_brt_response [https://
perma.cc/3WX4-J5W3].
25. Id.
26. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049
(1931).
27. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1145, 1148 (1932).
28. See John C.C. Macintosh, The Issues, Effects and Consequences of the Berle–Dodd Debate,
1931–1932, ACCT., ORG. AND SOC’Y, Feb. 1999, at 139, 139–153.
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were preoccupied with how best to control managers amidst what would
later be called “asymmetries of information.”29 They were concerned, that
is, with problems of agency which turned on concerns about management
power.
In hindsight, the two might be seen as sides of a coin: Berle
concerned for the harm that “real people”—managers—might cause the
more abstruse corpus of “shareholders”; while on the flip-side, Dodd is
seen as more concerned for the harm that an abstract “legal person”—the
firm—might visit upon the real people who make up its community of
interested stakeholders. Both were seeking to avoid harm that might occur
within different parts of a shared ecosystem, with each prioritizing a
different element.
Lacking that ecological perspective, the debate was cast in “eitheror” terms, and that artificially-binary formulation persists in current
echoes of the Great Debate. In the end, it was Berle who was seen to have
“won” the contest, and who was asked to serve among the Brain Trust that
FDR assembled and tasked with establishing the set of policy prescriptions
that ultimately came together to form the Securities Act of 1933, and which
thus established the basics for corporate law that remains with us today.30
II. WELTANSCHAUUNG
A. When You Change the Way You Look at Things . . .
We have inherited a rich and subtle literature in the field of corporate
governance that starts by asking, “For whom is the firm?” (e.g., the
shareholder v. stakeholder debate—a legalistic inquiry). To this,
especially latterly, is added an important dialogue that starts by asking,
“For what is the firm?”31 (an examination of purpose—predominantly an
economic inquiry). But if we are to re-examine such first-order questions,
29. Press Release, The Nobel Prize, Markets with Asymmetric Information (Oct. 10, 2001),
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2001/press-release/ [https://perma.cc/CR9JDY3M].
30. An interesting side-note to the Great Debate: in 1967, Berle complained that the 1933
Securities Act did not go far enough, and that it ultimately had “little to do with the conduct of the
corporation’s affairs beyond requiring regular publication of information considered accurate by
accounting standards.” The passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act following the Enron scandal thirtyyears later shows this faith in the sufficiency of financial reporting to have been somewhat misplaced.
See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
303 (1933).
31. See Big Business is Beginning to Accept Broader Social Responsibilities: Pursuing
Shareholder Value is No Longer Enough, it Seems, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 22, 2019),
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2019/08/22/big-business-is-beginning-to-accept-broader-social
-responsibilities?cid1=cust/dailypicks1/n/bl/n/20190828n/owned/n/n/dailypicks1/n/n/NA/299647/n
[https://perma.cc/ADX8-P2WN].
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overturn established orthodoxies, and trial new formulations, then we are
remiss if we fail to take a step farther back to ask, “What is the firm?”
(fundamentally, a philosophical inquiry).
If Man is “the freak of the universe,” then the corporate “legal
person” is more freakish yet, and must too explain its own existence.32
Since Coase penned The Nature of the Firm33 in 1937, we have tended
towards a bloodless, legalistic view of it as a nesting of contractual
obligations that works to minimize “transaction costs.”34 In fairness, this
formulation has been critiqued and debated since Coase’s writing, and
Coase himself felt his ideas were often misconstrued.35 Nevertheless, this
mechanistic perspective prevails in economic orthodoxy.36
Until now, when all such orthodoxies appear to be under assault,
from within and without. Renowned economist Mohammed A. El-Erian
sees society’s loss of confidence in orthodox economics (and economists)
as a consequence of the profession’s predilection for “simplistic
theoretical assumptions,” its reliance on mathematical techniques “that
prize elegance over real-world applicability,” and its “routine failure” to
draw on insights from behavioral science.37 This self-selected idiographic
“insularity” from other fields of inquiry leaves economics poorer and
economists distrusted, writes Bank of England Chief Economist Andy
Haldane.38 “The intellectual marketplace awaits a fresh approach to the
structuring of work and the good society,” argues Sebastian Mallaby,
fellow for international economics at the Council on Foreign Relations, in
a recent piece entitled How Economist’s Faith in Markets Broke
America.39
32. FROMM, supra note 4, at 40.
33. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 386–405 (1937).
34. See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J. L. & ECON. 233 (1979).
35. John Cassidy, Ronald Coase and the Misuse of Economics, NEW YORKER (Sept. 3, 2013),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/ronald-coase-and-the-misuse-of-economics [https://
perma.cc/E56V-UYJY].
36. It is an interesting side-note that Coase claims to have developed his theory of the firm while
preparing for a series of lectures in 1932, after spending a year working in the US, at the very time of
the Berle-Dodd debate. Ronald H. Coase, Prize Lecturer, Lecture to the Memory of Alfred Nobel: The
Institution Structure of Production (Dec. 9, 1991), https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economicsciences/1991/coase/lecture/ [https://perma.cc/RVP9-GHZR].
37. Mohamed A. El-Erian, Why Economics Must Get Broader Before It Gets Better, PROJECT
SYNDICATE (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/mainstream-economicsmust-learn-from-others-by-mohamed-a—el-erian-2019-03?barrier=accesspaylog (last visited Jan. 28,
2020).
38. Andrew Haldane & Arthur Turrell, An Interdisciplinary Model for Macroeconomics, 34
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL. 219 (2019).
39. Sebastian Mallaby, How Economists’ Faith in Markets Broke America and What it Means
for Our Future, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 15, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive
/2019/09/nicolas-lemann-binyamin-appelbaum-economics/594718/ [https://perma.cc/K4F5-ZYC7].
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The law is meant to codify our ideas about how human affairs are
best managed so that they work to promote our values. The law provides
the scaffolding for our institutional and economic structures, but the
ultimate design-work belongs to the humanities. We need a fleshy,
humanistic theory of the firm, one that is organic rather than mechanistic.
“In a world in which contracts are incomplete, unenforceable, or
infeasible, then the ability to commit to and sustain relations of trust is
critical to the scope of economic activity,” argues Colin Mayer.40 “The
corporation is not a ‘nexus of contracts’ between the parties to the firm,”
he adds. “It is the opposite; it is a nexus of relations. Those relations are
built on trust.”41
Mayer is most assuredly correct, in my view. And, this “nexus of
relations” formulation overcomes some of the sterility in the Berle and
Dodd debate and the mechanistic emphases of Coase. But trust is not
something that lends itself readily to econometric analysis. The
economist’s treatment of trust starts most often from a macro-economic
perspective; the literature regarding the significance of trust in microeconomic analyses is sparse by comparison.
Trust is a phenomenon that belongs to Fromm’s “being a part-ness,”
and too often this relational dynamic has been incidental to, or wholly
ignored by, “serious” inquiries into the nature of the firm. But as Max
Planck once said, “When you change the way you look at things, the things
you look at change.” And we are beginning to look at things anew.
B. Trust Issues
Economists have long acknowledged the importance of trust in
economic life. Nobel Prize winner Kenneth Arrow was among the first
modern economists to emphasize the significance of trust in our day-today transactions.42 In 1972, he argued that “Virtually every commercial
transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction
conducted over a period of time,” adding—not insignificantly for my
purposes here—“It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic
backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual
confidence.”43 Where trust is wanting, we are impoverished.
Some twenty years later, Francis Fukuyama argued for the
significance of trust in the realm of economic life, defining it as, “the
40. MAYER, supra note 16, at 156.
41. Id. at 39.
42. John Stuart Mill made the far earlier observation in his Principles of Political Economy: “The
advantage to mankind of being able to trust one another, penetrates into every crevice and cranny of
human life: the economical is perhaps the smallest part of it, yet even this is incalculable.” JOHN
STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 108 (Sir W.J. Ashley ed., 1848).
43. Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343, 357 (1972).
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expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and
cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of
members of that community.”44 Fukuyama describes trust as a sort of
informal “currency” that facilitates exchange and supports the cooperation
that is central to creating and maintaining social order. Trust provides a
kind of “social glue” that allows for the smooth functioning of groups,
firms, organizations, and institutions.45
In short, trust allows for activities that would not occur without it.
And while this may be true in our day-to-day transactions and for the
functioning of whole economic orders, it is true also in connection with
more idiosyncratic and micro-economic considerations, such as the
functioning of firms and even a given firm’s value in the market context.
Trust is thus a “material” business consideration.
“Trust matters first because companies are at the bedrock of our
communities and our economies,” writes Greg Medcraft, head of the
OECD’s Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs.46 “But trust in
business also matters because, more and more, a company’s reputation is
a major part of its share price and a key source of competitive
advantage.”47 This is all the more so the case, Medcraft observes, when
some 85% of the market value of the S&P 500 is estimated to be made up
of intangible value. That is over $21 trillion in value that is largely
derivative of the trust consumers place in a brand and the company behind
it.48 A recent study from Accenture ties a loss of such trust in business to
a financial loss that it estimates “conservatively” at $180 billion.49
So, trust matters for transactions and markets, for the development
and functioning of economic systems, and for the value assigned to and
sustained by a firm. It is, therefore, a significant worry that Gallup reports
businesses worldwide to be suffering from a crisis in trust50—a view heard
44. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 26
(1995).
45. Karen S. Cook & Bogdan State, Trust and Economic Organization: Class, Status and Power
(May 15, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see FUKUYAMA, supra note 44, at 26.
46. See JEFFREY KUPFER & STEPHEN SCOTT, CULTURE & CONDUCT RISK IN THE BANKING
SECTOR: WHY IT MATTERS AND WHAT REGULATORS ARE DOING TO ADDRESS IT 7 (2019).
47. Id.
48. See Bruce Berman, $21 Trillion In U.S. Intangible Assets Is 84% of S&P 500 Value – IP
Rights and Reputation Included, IP CLOSEUP (June 4, 2019), https://ipcloseup.com/2019/06/04/21trillion-in-u-s-intangible-asset-value-is-84-of-sp-500-value-ip-rights-and-reputation-included/ [https
://perma.cc/2P6F-TX7J].
49. See Greg Sterling, Study Finds Decline in ‘Trust’ Costs Corporations Billions in Profits,
MARKETING LAND (Nov. 5, 2018), https://marketingland.com/study-finds-decline-in-trust-costscorporations-billions-in-profits-251186 [https://perma.cc/U473-Z3EA].
50. See Ghassan Khoury & Steve Crabtree, Are Businesses Worldwide Suffering From a Trust
Crisis?, THE REAL FUTURE OF WORK (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.gallup.com/workplace/246194/
businesses-worldwide-suffering-trust-crisis.aspx [https://perma.cc/M6EL-4Q77].
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throughout the last year. In its 2018 Annual Report, for instance, the IMF
argued, “Global economic momentum is under pressure from a slow
erosion [or] weakening of trust in institutions—and trust, of course, is the
lifeblood of any economy.”51 The World Bank’s annual Spring Meetings
featured discussion of risks to the global financial system coming as a
consequence of what participants termed the “distrust trap.”52 In an
address to the General Assembly, U.N. Secretary General António
Guterres argued that the world is suffering from a “Trust Deficit
Disorder.”53 That theme that was echoed repeatedly in Davos as 2019 got
started.54 And again, later in the year, when the OECD announced the
launch of a “Trust in Business Initiative.”55
C. Illusions of Understanding
But while the importance of trust in the macro-economic context has
won greater attention in recent years, our consideration of its importance
at the micro-economic level of the firm has received comparatively far less
study. Where such attention to trust is given, the tendency is to inquire into
trust as a driver of brand value; that is, we focus on trust in a company
from among those outside of it, rather than attending to the significance of
trust within the company among those who make it up. But if Colin Mayer
is correct in arguing for the firm as a “nexus of relations,” then the trust
dynamics that define those relations are of paramount importance. And to
appreciate the existential significance of trust in this context, it is helpful
to take a step back—a big one.
“We assume that a large brain, the use of tools, superior learning
abilities and complex social structures are huge advantages,” writes Yuval
Noah Harari.56 “But humans enjoyed all of these advantages for a full 2
million years during which they remained weak and marginal creatures.”57
What changed? Harari argues that an understanding of human history from
the time of the Agricultural Revolution to the present really boils down to
51. IMF, ANNUAL REPORT 2018: BUILDING A SHARED FUTURE ii (2018).
52. Building Trust and Resilience, IMF: SPRING MEETINGS SEMINAR EVENT (Apr. 18, 2018),
https://www.imf.org/external/POS_Meetings/SeminarDetails.aspx?SeminarId=293 [https://perma.cc
/RE6X-FVHM].
53. António Guterres, Secretary Gen., U.N., Address to the General Assembly (Sep. 25, 2018),
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2018-09-25/address-73rd-general-assembly [https://
perma.cc/J7AC-CLRW].
54. Hadas Gold, Trust is the New Buzzword in Davos. Here’s Why, CNN BUSINESS (Jan. 25,
2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/25/business/trust-companies-davos/index.html [https://perma.
cc/BV9S-743G].
55. OECD Trust in Business Initiative, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/trust-business.htm
[https://perma.cc/24EE-85VH].
56. YUVAL NOAH HARARI, SAPIENS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF HUMANKIND 11 (2015).
57. Id.
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this single question: “How did humans organize themselves in mass
cooperation networks?”58 The answer is found in our having developed a
successful means for institutionalizing relations of trust, first with kith and
kin, and later with strangers.59
Here, Harari emphasizes research by Robin Dunbar, the
evolutionary anthropologist who gained renown for his work on the
“social brain hypothesis” and its implications for human social orders.60
For reasons that fall outside my scope here, Dunbar concludes that the
nature of the human brain is such that we are able to maintain close
relationships with, on average, about 150 people—the so-called “Dunbar
Number.” These relationships are arranged in a hierarchy of sorts, which
Dunbar depicts as concentric rings marked by decreasing emotional
intensity as we move farther from the center of our social worlds.61
“We only see each of the 100 individuals in the outer 150 layer of
our social networks approximately twice a year, whereas, on average, we
see each of the members of our innermost circle of 5 every other day,”
Dunbar has observed through a series of fascinating studies. “Between
them, these five people account for around 40 per cent of all our social
effort—and our emotional capital. The outermost [150] layer accounts for
less than 20 per cent of our social effort,” Dunbar writes.62

58. See id. at 133.
59. Herbert Gintis, The Evolution of Human Cooperation, EVOLUTION INST. (Jan. 11, 2012),
https://evolution-institute.org/focus-article/the-evolution-of-human-cooperation/?sfns=mo [https://
perma.cc/WH92-LBQ6].
60. See generally Robin I.M. Dunbar, Neocortex Size as a Constraint on Group Size in Primates,
22 J. HUM. EVOLUTION 469 (1992).
61. See infra Figure 1.
62. ROBIN DUNBAR, HUMAN EVOLUTION: OUR BRAINS AND BEHAVIOR 212 (2016).
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Figure 1: Dunbar Dynamics

Devotion of emotional energy to a small, core cadre of trusted peers
was evolutionarily advantageous. “It takes a tribe to raise a human,” as
Yuval Noah Harari puts it. “Evolution thus favored those capable of forming strong social ties.”63 With reference to Dunbar, Harari argues that “reliable information about who could be trusted meant that small bands
could expand into larger bands and Sapiens could develop tighter and more
sophisticated types of cooperation.”64 This was crucial to our survival as a
species.
Central to our ability to thrive as a species is that we devised an
institutional means by which to extend our circles of trust more broadly,
through transitive properties of trust: I trust a guy who trusts a guy who
trusts a guy.65 “[T]rust cannot be purely bilateral: trust between any two
people rests on a web of trust between each of them and the others with
whom they also deal,” writes economist Paul Seabright.66 “[T]rust is the
mortar for most of the encounters between strangers in a modern society,”
he argues.67 It is achieved through cultural dictates that encourage and
support cooperation as a behavioral norm, and those cultural dictates are
enlivened through human institutions that were established specifically to
serve this very function, if not always conscientiously.68 As a result of this
63. HARARI, supra note 56, at 10.
64. Id. at 24.
65. Cristina Acedo-Carmona & Antoni Gomila, Personal Trust Increases Cooperation Beyond
General Trust, PLOS: ONE (Aug. 21, 2014), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?
id=10.1371/journal.pone.0105559 [https://perma.cc/N3H5-RWZL].
66. PAUL SEABRIGHT, THE COMPANY OF STRANGERS: A NATURAL HISTORY OF ECONOMIC LIFE
65 (2004).
67. Id. at 112.
68. Id. at 108.
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institutionalized trust, “Sapiens can cooperate in extremely flexible ways
with countless numbers of strangers,” Harari writes. “That’s why Sapiens
rules the world.”69
What is true of our evolutionary past is true of our current enterprises.
“All the structures of which we are a part—congresses, universities, the
companies where we work, our minds, even—are merely temporary
collections of relations,” writes Joshua Cooper Ramo.70 And these
collections of relations permit us to accomplish extraordinary things. “[I]t
was the collective intelligence of human groups, not the intelligence of
individual humans, that first differentiated our human ancestors from all
their animal relatives,” writes Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s
Thomas Malone.71 He calls groups with such collective intelligence
“Superminds.”
Malone’s Superminds permeate our social world. They are found
wherever purposeful, thoughtful human endeavor is found. Even at the
level of individual projects, we rely on the collective intelligence that we
are able to access through others. “[I]ndividuals store very little detailed
information in their heads,” write Steven Sloman and Philip Fernbach in
The Knowledge Illusion.72 “In that sense, people are like bees and society
a beehive: our intelligence resides not in individual brains but in the
collective mind.”73 Indeed, “shared knowledge itself is a good marker of
community membership,” Dunbar observes.74 And because our individual
knowledge is enmeshed with that of others, “it is the community that
shapes our beliefs and attitudes.”75
Most often, we fail to recognize this, but it is critical to our
understanding of any human undertaking. We believe that we are the sole
authors of our own thinking and problem-solving. We emphasize our
“being apart-ness.” And we are wrong to do so. “Social intelligence
enhanced by group selection made Homo sapiens the first fully dominant
species in Earth’s history,” writes the preeminent biologist Edward O.
Wilson.76

69. HARARI, supra note 56, at 25.
70. JOSHUA COOPER RAMO, THE SEVENTH SENSE: POWER, FORTUNE, AND SURVIVAL IN THE
AGE OF NETWORKS 117 (2016).
71. THOMAS W. MALONE, SUPERMINDS: THE SURPRISING POWER OF PEOPLE AND COMPUTERS
THINKING TOGETHER 8 (2018).
72. STEVEN SLOMAN & PHILIP FERNBACH, THE KNOWLEDGE ILLUSION: WHY WE NEVER THINK
ALONE 5 (2017).
73. Id.
74. ROBIN DUNBAR, HOW MANY FRIENDS DOES ONE PERSON NEED?: DUNBAR’S NUMBER AND
OTHER EVOLUTIONARY QUIRKS 82 (2010).
75. SLOMAN & FERNBACH, supra note 72, at 16.
76. EDWARD O. WILSON, THE MEANING OF HUMAN EXISTENCE 75 (2014).
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The firm’s essence is that of a nexus of relationships. It functions
through human ties from which a collective intelligence emerges. It is a
Supermind. Or, more accurately, it is a nested aggregation of Superminds.
And its performance turns on the sustained trust relationships that bind its
members. “Our sense of self, our ‘heart and intuition,’ is actually part of
what ensures that most of us will conform to group norms, promoting
social harmony,” writes social neuroscientist Matt Lieberman.77 “Our self
works for the group to ensure that we will fit in.”78 Unconscious of this,
however, we operate with what Sloman and Fernbach call “an illusion of
understanding.”79
We must shake off this illusion, apprehend the true nature of the firm
as a community, as a nexus of relations, and we must consider closely the
trust dynamics—the social capital80—that exists and is traded among
members, facilitating a “we is greater than me” psychosocial
predisposition.81 “Economists have long studied human capital as a driver
of productivity in organizations,” Lieberman notes, but “most studies of
human capital ignore the concept of social capital, the social connections
and social networks within the organization.” Is it human capital alone that
leads to productivity increase, Lieberman asks, “or does social capital play
a role in catalyzing human output into optimal performance?”82
III. GESTALT
A. She Who Must Be Obeyed
In his 1953 essay, The Methodology of Positive Economics, Milton
Friedman argued that economic theories should be judged by their ability
to predict behavior correctly: “The only relevant test of the validity of a
hypothesis is comparison of its predictions with experience.”83 By this
measure, alas, we must judge the social sciences harshly.84

77. MATTHEW D. LIEBERMAN, SOCIAL: WHY OUR BRAINS ARE WIRED TO CONNECT 202 (2013).
78. Id.
79. SLOMAN & FERNBACH, supra note 72, at 8.
80. Francis Fukuyama, Social Capital and Civil Society, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Oct. 1, 1999),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/1999/reforms/fukuyama.htm#figI [https://perma.cc/T5
KY-3YTL].
81. Michael Tomasello, The Origins of Human Morality, SCI. AM. (Sept. 2018), https://www.
scientificamerican.com/article/the-origins-of-human-morality/ [https://perma.cc/5E85-5FYZ].
82. LIEBERMAN, supra note 76, at 262.
83. Mark Thoma, Milton Friedman: The Methodology of Positive Economics, ECONOMIST’S
VIEW (Nov. 26, 2006), https://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2006/11/milton_
friedman_2.html [https://perma.cc/79DC-87KM].
84. See generally George Bragues, The Financial Crisis and the Failure of Modern Social
Science, 3 QUALITATIVE RES. FIN. MKTS. 177 (2011).
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Consider the failure of economists to anticipate the Financial Crisis,
leading Britain’s Queen Elizabeth to ask, famously, “why did nobody
notice it?”85 An accomplished group of British economists later wrote in
reply to Her Majesty, explaining that the profession’s failure to anticipate
the Crisis had resulted from “a failure of the collective imagination of
many bright people, both in this country and internationally, to understand
the risks to the system as a whole.”86 That is, economists and risk managers
had failed to take an eco-systemic view of the global financial system, or
at least a sufficiently well-informed one.
“People expect from the social sciences—anthropology, sociology,
economics, and political science—the knowledge to understand their lives
and control their future. They want the power to predict,” writes E. O.
Wilson.87 Yet our economic models leave us persistently flat-footed.
Wilson contends that our economic models have failed us for having been
“sealed off from the complexities of human behavior and the constraints
imposed by the environment.” For too long, studies in the social sciences
have been conducted without sufficient appeal to the natural sciences, he
argues. The solution lies in what Wilson refers to as consilience: “the
linking of facts and fact-based theory across disciplines to create a
common groundwork of explanation.”88
Noble Prize-winning economist Robert Solow sounded a similar note
nearly fifty years ago. “I imagine that biochemistry and biophysics got
started,” he wrote, “not because someone thought that biology should be
interdisciplinary as a matter of principle, but because concrete research
problems arose on the borderline of the biological and the chemical or
physical.”89 Similarly, our deepest challenges today sit at the borderline of
the social and the natural sciences.
Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in the seemingly
interminable parade of misconduct scandals that fill the headlines—
particularly in the financial industry, where punitive fines for misconduct
are estimated to total nearly $400 billion in the last several years.90 How
is it that these problems have not yet been managed away?
85. Andrew Pierce, The Queen Asks Why No One Saw the Credit Crunch Coming, THE
TELEPGRAPH (Nov. 5, 2008), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/theroyalfamily/3386353/
The-Queen-asks-why-no-one-saw-the-credit-crunch-coming.html [https://perma.cc/4X3R-JP27].
86. Letter from Tim Besley, professor, London School of Econ. & Peter Hennessy, professor,
University of London, to Her Majesty the Queen, United Kingdom (July 22, 2009),
https://wwwf.imperial.ac.uk/~bin06/M3A22/queen-lse.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2QD-LXVV].
87. EDWARD O. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE 197 (1998).
88. Id. at 214.
89. Robert M. Solow, Science and Ideology in Economics, 41 PUB. INT. 94, 101–02 (1970).
90. Elisa Martinuzzi, The Next Round of Bank Scandals Will be Personal, BLOOMBERG OPINION
(May 20, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-05-20/bank-scandals-turn-tonon-financial-misconduct [https://perma.cc/6XXH-ARSV].
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I contend that it is due to a failure to achieve consilience between the
natural and social sciences. Instead, we embrace denuded models of
human dynamics that take Fromm’s “being apart-ness” as their starting
point. We imagine solitary Homo economicus, rationally calculating how
best to respond to one-dimensional incentives (almost always conceived
of in monetary terms), aiming to maximize immediate economic utility in
a mechanistic context. This leaves us believing that management science
need only concern itself with setting these incentives properly and desired
behaviors will follow, inevitably. As I have argued elsewhere, these ideas
are manifestly, demonstrably, repeatedly, and maddeningly wrong.91
“The intellectual conception of the corporation from Adam Smith to
the present is fundamentally wrong,” Mayer veritably shouts from his
pages.92 “We economists have witnessed the failure of our profession, a
failure that needs to be analyzed and fixed,” writes renowned economist
Luigi Zingales.93 “The practice of management has been stuck in time for
more than 30 years,” Gallup laments.94
As Francis Bacon instructed nearly 400 years ago: “[N]ature is only
to be commanded by obeying her.”95 Until we appreciate that all human
behaviors are fundamentally and unavoidably shaped by our social
nature,96 we will manage our enterprises sub-optimally. We will manage
behavioral risks sub-optimally and persistently from the back foot.
Misconduct scandals will continue unabated, and the public’s faith in our
most essential organizations and institutions will erode further. The “Trust
Crisis” will worsen.97

91. Nicholas Christakis et al., A Copernican Revolution in Culture and Conduct Risk
Management, REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/bc-finreg-culture-conductrisk-managemen/a-copernican-revolution-in-culture-and-conduct-risk-management-idUSKBN1KN
2BR [https://perma.cc/GSC6-3UF6].
92. MAYER, supra note 16, at 37.
93. LUIGI ZINGALES, A CAPITALISM FOR THE PEOPLE: RECAPTURING THE LOST GENIUS OF
AMERICAN PROSPERITY 94 (2012).
94. JIM CLIFTON & JIM HARTER, IT’S THE MANAGER: GALLUP FINDS THE QUALITY OF
MANAGERS AND TEAM LEADERS IS THE SINGLE BIGGEST FACTOR IN YOUR ORGANIZATION'S LONGTERM SUCCESS 5 (2019).
95. SIR FRANCIS BACON, NOVUM ORGANUM 106 (Joseph Devey ed., P.F. Collier 1902) (1620).
96. Robert J. Aumann, A Synthesis of Behavioural and Mainstream Economics, NATURE HUM.
BEHAV. (May 27, 2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-019-0617-3 (last visited Jan. 28,
2020).
97. See Sandra J. Sucher & Shalene Gupta, The Trust Crisis, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 23, 2019),
https://hbr.org/cover-story/2019/07/the-trust-crisis [https://perma.cc/57HV-JZKZ].
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B. Embracing Complexity
The problem is one of complexity.98 “Knowing the parts is not
equivalent to knowing the whole,” complexity scientist John Miller
advises. “To truly understand hives, markets, and brains, we need to
understand how the interactions of honeybees, traders, and neurons result
in system-wide, aggregate behavior.”99 And to understand firms, we need
to understand the interaction dynamics among those within them.100
Complicated systems may have many moving parts, but they follow
a fairly stable, linear set of rules, much like algorithms that follow an
“if/then” logic. Complex systems, by contrast, are non-linear and are
characterized by “a subtle dynamic interplay of positive feedback,
negative feedback, and cascading chain reactions.”101 Any human
organization is a complex system. We are joined in a network of
interactions with others. Those interactions—and our expectations of
future interactions—influence our behavior. This, then, influences the
responsive behavior of others throughout the organization in a rippleeffect that, in turn, results in emergent systemic change—which, then,
further (re-)shapes our interactions.
In complex systems, emergent outcomes arise through the interplay
between any given agent with any other agent(s). Those emergent
outcomes influence the subsequent behavior of all agents, who respond to
one another’s responses to such influence, in a ceaseless series of
interactions that work either to reinforce the emergent outcomes or to
prompt new ones, which alter the system yet again.102
Though we may be able to apprehend this network of interactions
cognitively, it is hard to operationalize the implications of complexity in

98. Eric Beinhocker, Video: The Economy as a Complex and Evolving System, INST. NEW ECON.
THINKING (June 5, 2019), https://www.inet.ox.ac.uk/publications/the-economy-as-a-complex-andevolving-system/ [https://perma.cc/J3FE-SXWD].
99. JOHN H. MILLER, A CRUDE LOOK AT THE WHOLE: THE SCIENCE OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS IN
BUSINESS, LIFE, AND SOCIETY 228 (2015).
100. See Esko Kilpi, Work is Interaction, MEDIUM (Mar. 17, 2015), https://medium.com
/@EskoKilpi/work-as-interaction-bfecdd8ea1a1 [https://perma.cc/6MT5-W6GZ].
101. LEN FISHER, THE PERFECT SWARM: THE SCIENCE OF COMPLEXITY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 36
(2009).
102. See generally Brian J. L. Berry, et al., Adaptive Agents, Intelligence, and Emergent Human
Organization: Capturing Complexity Through Agent-Based Modeling, 99 PNAS 7187, 7187 (May
2002) (“For some years now, new approaches to the study of complex adaptive systems have offered
researchers in both the physical and social sciences an important new theoretical and methodological
framework for helping to understand a variety of nonlinear, dynamic systems. Complex adaptive
systems are characterized often by ‘agents’ interacting or capable of interacting with each other in
dynamic, often nonlinear and surprising ways. Most social phenomena would readily fit the
description of a complex adaptive system.”).
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practical management processes.103 Thus, “we tolerate complexity by
failing to recognize it.”104 Traditional management science fails to
acknowledge all we have learned about the principal adaptive quality of
our species: its eusociality. And because it operates in a manner that is
“sealed off from the complexities of human behavior,” management
science repeatedly fails us.105
We must learn to embrace complexity. We exist almost exclusively
within social ecologies.106 All of our endeavors involve coming together
in complex networks of mutual trust.107 We habitually join with others to
form Superminds that extend individual capacities into evolutionarily
advantageous “super-abilities” that put Homo sapiens at the top of the
evolutionary ladder. This informs our inner lives of private experience: it
shapes, and in many ways, defines our very selfs. As such, the self is social,
and the experience of our innermost individuality (our “set apart-ness”) is
largely an emergent property flowing from our existence within complex
adaptive groups (our “being a part-ness”)—groups that have their own
existential imperatives.
C. The Company that Keeps You . . .
“[P]eople must belong to a tribe; they yearn to have a purpose larger
than themselves,” Wilson writes. “We are obliged by the deepest drives of
the human spirit to make ourselves more than just animated dust, and we
must have a story to tell about where we came from, and why we are
here.”108
This is Fromm’s existential dilemma. And, as I have sought to argue
here, the answers that we craft and pose in seeking to address it—the
stories we tell ourselves and one another about “why we are here”—are
necessarily social stories, even if we may seek to convince ourselves
otherwise. Our sense of identity, our perceptions of self, are social
constructs. We may experience them privately, but they would not exist
outside the set of relations within which our selfs are enmeshed and from
which they are fashioned. We acknowledge this, albeit obliquely, when
we say, “you are the company you keep.” But I believe that we have this

103. See generally Kevin J. Dooley, A Complex Adaptive Systems Model of Organization
Change, 1 NONLINEAR DYNAMICS, PSYCHOL., & LIFE SCI. 69 (1997).
104. SLOMAN & FERNBACH, supra note 72, at 35.
105. WILSON, supra note 76, at 214.
106. See Robert Foley & Clive Gamble, The Ecology of Social Transitions in Human Evolution,
364 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B. 3267 (2009).
107. See Charles Tilly, Trust and Rule, 33 THEORY & SOC’Y 1 (2019).
108. WILSON, supra note 76, at 6.
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precisely backwards; rather, we should say, “you are the company that
keeps you.”
Wilson urges us to work towards a unity of knowledge across the
social and natural sciences. So, let us consider what the social sciences
have taught us: the single most powerful human drive is the drive to
belong.109 We see this in the earliest development of infants and
children.110 Our evolutionary history is such that social exclusion is
existentially terrifying.111 We respond to ostracism as we do to physical
pain, and chronic exposure leaves us with lasting feelings of helplessness,
hopelessness, and depression.112 One study has found that, even in a game
with a computer, experiencing ostracism is sufficient to trigger lower
levels of self-esteem. “We interpret these results as strong evidence for a
very primitive and automatic adaptive sensitivity to even the slightest hint
of social exclusion,” the authors conclude.113
And now let us consider lessons from natural science. Stanford’s
Robert Sapolsky is one of the leading professors of biology and neurology
in the world and a recipient of the MacArthur Foundation’s genius grant.
Sapolsky observes that the brain region most involved in feeling fear and
anxiety, the amygdala, is also the region most involved in generating
aggression.114 “The amygdala,” he tells us, “is particularly sensitive to
unsettling circumstances that are social.”115 The amygdala also works, in
partnership with the insular cortex, to process our experience of disgust.116
“The insula activates when we eat a cockroach or imagine doing so,”
Sapolsky writes.117 And this very same cerebral circuitry engages when
we experience some-one as disgusting. “The insula and amygdala activate
when we think of the neighboring tribe as loathsome cockroaches,”
Sapolsky continues.118 “This is central to how our brains process ‘us’ and
‘them.’”119
109. See generally R.F. Baumeister & M.R. Leary, The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal
Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 497 (1995).
110. See generally Harriet Over, The Origins of Belonging: Social Motivation in Infants and
Young Children, 371 PHILO. TRANS. R SOC. LOND. B BIOL. SCI. 1686 (2016).
111. See Kipling D. Williams, Ostracism: The Kiss of Social Death, 1 SOC. & PERS. PSYCHOL.
COMPASS 236 (2007).
112. See Kipling D. Williams, Ostracism, 58 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 425, 431–32 (2006).
113. Lisa Zadro, Kipling D. Williams & Rick Richardson, How Low Can You Go? Ostracism by
a Computer Is Sufficient to Lower Self-Reported Levels of Belonging, Controlling, Self-Esteem, and
Meaningful Existence, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 560, 560 (2004).
114. See ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, BEHAVE: THE BIOLOGY OF HUMANS AT OUR BEST AND WORST
(2017).
115. Id. at 33–34.
116. Id. at 41–42.
117. Id. at 41.
118. Id. at 41–42.
119. Id. at 42.
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Nicholas Christakis, director of Yale’s Human Nature Lab, is a
distinguished sociologist and medical doctor. He is deeply familiar with
both the social and the natural sciences. Christakis is an optimist. In
Blueprint, he outlines a “social suite” of human behavioral predilections
that have worked throughout our species’ history to promote the
development of collaborative social orders.120 However, as Christakis
observes, studies find that, even when very young children are assigned to
distinct teams—the red shirts and the blue shirts, in one such study—“usversus-them” behaviors appear.121 “In-group affection and out-group
hatred seem entangled,” he laments, even when group assignment is
wholly arbitrary and known to be so.122
To be ostracized is to be deemed disgusting. To be deemed
disgusting leads to being ostracized. We may be able to tolerate this from
the neighboring tribe—“the blue shirts”—but when this occurs among
those within the innermost of our Dunbar social circles, it is unbearable.
Thus, we do what we must to “fit in” and to maintain in-group status; to
avoid ostracism. We achieve this by cooperating with our peers and
conforming to their established norms of behavior. Our social nature leads
to a “normative compliance”123 in our actions: we behave such that we
may remain welcome among and embraced by our trusted peer groups
within each of our social domains.
“The preponderance of the evidence—both observational and
experimental—supports the hypothesis that we cooperate primarily
because we crave reward (engagement) and fear punishment (exclusion)
from other members of our group,” writes the renowned security
technologist Bruce Schneier.124 The natural sciences and the social
sciences agree: we are social beings to the core, our very identity is
socially-bounded, and therefore a threat to our social connectedness is a
threat to our very identity.125

120. See NICHOLAS A. CHRISTAKIS, BLUEPRINT: THE EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF A GOOD
SOCIETY 13 (2019). Full disclosure: I am fortunate to have Nicholas as an advisor to my business and
to count him as a friend.
121. Id. at 5.
122. Brian Gallagher, Humans Are Wired for Good, NAUTILUS (Aug. 22, 2019), http://nautil.us/
issue/75/story/humans-are-wired-for-goodness [https://perma.cc/CBU7-SNNR].
123. See generally Giulia Andrighetto, Daniela Grieco & Luca Tummolini, Perceived
Legitimacy of Normative Expectations Motivates Compliance with Social Norms When Nobody Is
Watching, 6 FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOL. 1413 (2015).
124. BRUCE SCHNEIER, LIARS & OUTLIERS: ENABLING THE TRUST THAT SOCIETY NEEDS TO
THRIVE 88 (2012).
125. See generally Michael A. Hogg, The Search for Social Identity Leads to “Us” versus
“Them”, SCI. AM. (Sept. 1, 2019), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-search-for-socialidentity-leads-to-us-versus-them/ [https://perma.cc/239W-4469].

2020]

Coercive Competition

787

D. Identity Economics
Nobel prize-winning economist George Akerlof writes of a “missing
motivation” in macroeconomic thought, arguing that traditional theories
fail to give adequate attention to social norms in shaping our behavior.126
Consideration of the imperative of normative compliance in the context of
the utility function imparts a necessary balance to macroeconomics and
affords “due account of the purposefulness of human decisions,” he
writes.127 “Sociology is dense in examples of people’s views as to how
they and others should behave, their joy when they live up to those
standards, and their discomfort and reactions when they fail to do so,” he
adds.128 And since group norms establish a behavioral ideal, Akerlof
concludes, the utility function must allow for “a loss in utility dependent
on the distance of behavior from that ideal.”129
This notion from the social science of economics comports with
Dunbar’s findings in the natural science of evolutionary anthropology.
“Many of our solutions to the problems of survival and successful
reproduction are social,” he writes, “and social solutions require an
intermediate step—making sure that the community pulls together.”130 In
the consilient perspective urged upon us by Wilson, the “rational actor” is
thus one who internalizes the behavioral norms of peers and acts in a
manner consistent with those norms.131
Evidence that we act to maximize the utility of in-group status
through behavioral conformity abounds, ranging from the ridiculous to the
absurd. Studies find that people conform to behavioral norms even when
they are wholly arbitrary, leading researchers to conclude that, “identity is
not stable but is instead driven by context.”132 For instance, studies show
that we tend to order more food in a restaurant if our waiter is obese:
physical appearance signals a norm for excessive consumption.133 Other
studies find that, when we order the same dish as one another in a

126. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Missing Motivation in Macroeconomics, 97 AM.
ECON. REV. 5 (2007).
127. Id. at 31.
128. Id. at 10.
129. Id. at 8.
130. DUNBAR, supra note 62, at 282.
131. See generally Sergey Gavrilets & Peter J. Richerson, Collective Action and the Evolution
of Social Norm Internalization, PNAS (June 6, 2017), https://www.pnas.org/content/114/23/6068
[https://perma.cc/AUA5-HQLT].
132. Campbell Pryor, Amy Perfors & Piers D.L. Howe, Even Arbitrary Norms Influence Moral
Decision-Making, 3 NAT. HUM. BEHAV. 57, 60 (2019).
133. See generally Tim Döring & Brian Wansink, The Waiter’s Weight: Does a Server’s BMI
Relate to How Much Food Diners Order, 49 ENV’T & BEHAV. 192 (2017).
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restaurant, we are later more inclined to trust one another.134 And when we
partake of communal dishes in a shared meal, cooperation increases
thereafter.135 This “shared plates, shared minds” phenomenon both reflects
and serves to promote trust and collaboration;136 our beneficial eusociality.
“In economics and in the remainder of the social sciences as well, the
translation from individual to aggregate behavior is the key analytic
problem,” writes Wilson.137 “Yet in these disciplines the exact nature and
sources of individual behavior are rarely considered.”138 What I have
sought to illustrate here is that the sources of individual behavior are
social. “Experiments in social psychology, and now increasingly in
economics,” Akerlof writes, “show that individuals’ behavior depends on
who people think they are.”139 Thus, if we wish to understand aggregate
behavior in any organizational context, we must enquire into the identity
dynamics that are at work—for even individual identity is social in nature.
The “nexus of relationships” within which we reside imprints upon
us a series of contextual identities that influence how we behave in a given
social or organizational setting. “A gain in identity utility can represent the
enjoyment people experience when they do something that makes them fit
in with a group,” Akerlof observes.140 (It is good to be one of us.) “It also
can represent the gains from differentiating one group from another.”141 (It
is good not to be one of them.) The conclusion is that identity utility
“derives from group processes.”142
“Identities reside in relations with others: you-me and us-them,”
Tilly tells us.143 We are primed by evolution to maintain in-group status
among networks of trusted peers, and we achieve this through normative
compliance and a cooperative pre-disposition.144 To fail in this is to be
ostracized, to be deemed “disgusting,” to be expelled from the social
ecologies that shape our identities, and thus to experience a threat to our
very sense of self(s).

134. Kaitlin Woolley & Ayelet Fishbach, A Recipe for Friendship: Similar Food Consumption
Promotes Trust and Cooperation, 27 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 1, 1 (2017).
135. Kaitlin Woolley & Ayelet Fishbach, Shared Plates, Shared Minds: Consuming from a
Shared Plate Promotes Cooperation, 30 PSYCHOL. SCI. 541, 541 (2019).
136. See id.
137. Id. at 202.
138. WILSON, supra note 76, at 202.
139. GEORGE A. AKERLOF & RACHEL E. KRANTON, IDENTITY ECONOMICS: HOW OUR
IDENTITIES SHAPE OUR WORK, WAGES, AND WELL-BEING 28 (2010).
140. Id. at 24.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. CHARLES TILLY, IDENTITIES, BOUNDARIES & SOCIAL TIES 8 (2005).
144. Michael Tomasello, The Origins of Human Morality, SCI. AM. (Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.
scientificamerican.com/article/the-origins-of-human-morality/ [https://perma.cc/L9J2-SDWK].
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Regrettably, this has a dark side: a “common is moral” heuristic. Our
views of what is “right” or “wrong” depends less than we might think on
personal moral views. Rather, behavior that is deemed to be “right” is that
behavior which is witnessed among peers—and the more often it is seen,
the more right it must be. “A selfish behavior that was common was judged
as more moral than when rare,” one study found, “and an altruistic
behavior that was rare was judged as less moral than when common.”145
That is, we go along to get along, and research finds that this identity
dynamic promotes “conditional dishonesty.”146 People will cheat or act
otherwise unethically—even if contrary to their own sincerely held moral
views—when acting dishonestly works to preserve in-group status and
their related contextual identity. “Dishonesty begets dishonesty.”147
Indeed, some studies find that even a single individual impacts others’
dishonesty decision if they share the same social identity.148
This can have systemic effects across whole industries. Consider a
fascinating, if depressing, study regarding something called
“identity-priming.”149 The study recruited bank employees, half working
in a core business unit, such as private bankers, traders, etc., and the other
half coming from support units, such as risk, or human resources.150
Recruits were asked to toss a coin ten times and report the outcomes,
winning either twenty dollars or nothing for each toss depending on
whether they reported “heads” or “tails.”151 They were self-reporting and
knew that they were unobserved; thus the recruits were purposefully
positioned so as to enable cheating while, at the same time, they were
afforded the opportunity to hide behind an uncontestable claim that chance
was responsible for their good fortune.152 Related studies have shown that,
most often, people fail to take full advantage of such opportunities due to
the coercive force of an “honesty norm” that erodes one’s positive selfimage when cheating.153

145. Björn Lindström et al., The Role of a “Common is Moral” Heuristic in the Stability and
Change of Moral Norms, 147 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. GEN. 1, 30 (2017).
146. See generally Thomas Lauer & Anna Untertrifaller, Conditional Dishonesty (Feb. 1, 2019)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with Seattle University Law Review).
147. Dan Ariely & Ximena Garcia-Rada, The Contagion of Corruption, SCI. AM. (Sept. 1, 2019),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-contagion-of-corruption/
[https://perma.cc/7XH893EK].
148. See, e.g., Francesca Gino et al., Contagion and Differentiation in Unethical Behavior: The
Effect of One Bad Apple on the Barrel, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 393, 396–97 (2009).
149. See Alain Cohn et al., Business Culture and Dishonesty in the Banking Industry, 516
NATURE 86, 87 (2014).
150. Id. at 86.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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Here, however, the researchers entered a novel element. Before
conducting the coin-toss task, participants were asked to fill out a short
survey. Some were asked about their professional background (e.g., “What
is your function at this bank?”), while those in the control condition were
asked questions unrelated to their profession (e.g., “How many hours per
week do you watch television on average?”).154 By design, for those
recruits who were asked about their work, their professional identity was
intentionally called to mind, or “rendered salient,” for them.155 And, as the
study’s authors remind us, “[i]dentities are associated with specific social
norms prescribing permissible behaviours.”156
This mattered in the study. Statistical analysis shows that the control
group behaved honestly, reporting successful coin flips (and winning
twenty dollars) in 51.6% of the cases—not far from the 50–50 odds.157
Recruits whose professional identity as a banker had been primed by the
survey, however, reported successful coin flips 58.2% of the time—
significantly above what mere chance would permit. “Our results suggest
that bank employees’ compliance with the honesty norm was weakened in
the professional identity condition,” the study’s authors write.158
The experiment was then repeated with a group of recruits from
outside the financial industry. Again, some of the recruits had their
professional identity “primed” while others did not. In this case, the
identity-priming had no measurable effect: both the control group and the
primed group reported substantially similar results (e.g., little to no
cheating). The experiment was then run with a group of students. And
again, the honesty norm was found to prevail in both the primed and the
control groups. Only with bankers did identity-priming prompt increased
cheating. “Our results suggest that the prevailing business culture in the
banking industry favours dishonest behaviour and thus has contributed to
the loss of the industry’s reputation,” the authors conclude.159
Damon Centola studies “social epidemiology” (that is, behavioral
contagion) at the University of Pennsylvania. He observes a distinction
between “simple contagions” that are driven by mere exposure—like
ordering more food if the waiter is obese—and “complex contagions”
which require certain social dynamics if behavior is to spread.160 “The
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 87.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 88.
160. Santa Fe Institute, SFI Community Lecture–Damon Centola–How Behavior Spreads: The
Science of Complex Contagions, YOUTUBE (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=o0fDcUJMzkI (last visited Jan. 29, 2020).
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costlier, higher risk, or less familiar a behavior is, the more that the
decision to adopt depends upon social confirmation,” he writes.161 Centola
has found that we require “multiple sources of exposure” to a risky
behavior before contagion effects appear. This is the “common is moral”
heuristic at work: the riskier the behavior, “the more that success [of the
contagion effect] depends upon close-knit networks to establish trusted
relationships and provide social reinforcement for participation.”162
Our trust networks thus enable—indeed they prompt—complex
behavioral contagion. Man’s “being a part-ness” is not an unalloyed good:
behavioral imperatives that serve to sustain in-group status may promote
mis-behavior, as judged from an out-group perspective. And behaviors
that spread via complex contagion are sticky: “The factors that create
resistance to a behavior before adoption may also become the reasons for
sticking with it after adoption,” Centola suggests.163
You are the company that keeps you. The groups to which we gain
admittance in life shape our behavior. Initially, this is through a “peer
pressure” function that activates our evolutionarily adaptive tendency
towards normative compliance; thereafter, through an internalization of
group behavioral norms. This has implications in the workplace. “Identity
economics,” as Akerlof terms it, “suggests that a firm operates well when
employees identify with it and when their norms advance its goals.”164 But
studies show that workers most often identify with their immediate
workgroup, rather than with the organization as a whole.165 And those with
whom employees choose to interact, Centola tells us, is determined less so
by the conscious choices of individuals and more so “by the structure of
the social world they inhabit, the identities it activates, and the
interdependence that it creates.”166
“We live in this web of social relationships, and a lot of what we do
and the satisfaction we derive comes from the web of social relationships,”
writes MIT’s Sandy Pentland, author of Social Physics. “[I]f you want to
get people to coordinate or change their behavior, you have to first and
foremost deal with the existing web of relationships, rather than treat
people as isolated individuals.”167 The persistence of mis-conduct scandals
suggests that management science has yet to recognize this, implying a
161. DAMON CENTOLA, HOW BEHAVIOR SPREADS: THE SCIENCE OF COMPLEX CONTAGIONS 36
(2018).
162. Id. at 91.
163. Id. at 82.
164. AKERLOF & KRANTON, supra note 139, at 15.
165. Id. at 52.
166. CENTOLA, supra note 161, at 156 (emphasis added).
167. Jennifer Chu, Searching for Balloons in a Social Network, MIT NEWS (Oct. 28, 2011),
http://news.mit.edu/2011/red-balloons-study-102811 [https://perma.cc/JXS3-C6B3].
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particular weakness on the part of those responsible for non-financial risk
management.
E. Resistance is Futile
The dominant theme I have sounded repeatedly throughout this
Article is that the human animal is a social creature; one that thrives within
collaborative ecosystems bound together most powerfully by shared trust
ties. Evolution has selected for the collaborative capacity this creates. It is
the basis of our astounding success as a species. And, as I have argued
more fully elsewhere, once we learned how to institutionalize trust, to
enable collaborative relations among strangers, at scale, we unlocked
prosperity the likes of which were never before known.168
The erosion of that “trust infrastructure” therefore poses a grave
threat to the basis of shared prosperity and to the peace that such prosperity
helps to sustain. I believe this to be the greatest peril we face today, in a
world full of perils. For without the institutional trust infrastructure that
forms the basis of collaboration among strangers, at scale and as a
presumed behavioral norm, we are thrust back into a Hobbesian world of
rival tribes; one in which life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and
short.”169
Signs of such civilizational degradation are all around us—to include
within the most prosperous of nations and within the world’s “Great
Democracies.”170 Reasons for the collapse in institutional trust are perhaps
many, but I would submit that a central issue is a decline in successful risk
governance. It may be unusual for those in risk governance roles to think
of their work in such a grand context but, as economist Luigi Zingales
notes, “When the fairness of the rules grows questionable and the benefits
of the system are distributed too unequally, the consensus for free-market
meritocracy can collapse.”171 Public corruption and corporate misconduct
must be considered in this light. When “the elites” charged with running
our institutions are seen repeatedly placing their interests before those of
the people they are meant to serve, it is little wonder that our shared trust
infrastructure erodes and that faith in “the system” is lost.172 It is the task
168. See Stephen Scott & Karen Cook, Risk Governance and the Politics of Rage, THOMSON
REUTERS (Nov. 2018), https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/insights/articles/risk-governance-politicsof-rage [https://perma.cc/7NRH-KGXM].
169. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Pelican Classics 1968) (1651).
170. Edward Luce, Troubling Warnings for the US From the 1930s, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/be952500-e7a8-11e5-a09b-1f8b0d268c39 (last visited Jan. 29, 2020).
171. ZINGALES, supra note 93, at 19–20.
172. Ron Fournier, Sophie Quinton & National Journal, In Nothing We Trust, THE ATLANTIC
(Apr. 19, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/in-nothing-we-trust/461160/
[https://perma.cc/G7G2-RGZH].
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of those in risk governance roles to guard against behavior that may result
in such wholesale disaffection.
Berle and Dodd were rightly concerned with the economic ecosystem
of their day. Despite a different locus of emphasis (powerful managers
versus shareholders for Berle; powerful “legal persons” versus
stakeholders for Dodd), what the two scholars shared in common was a
concern for trust. “Agency problems” and the troubles that flow from
“asymmetries of information” are fundamentally trust problems. The need
to manage such problems produces “transaction costs.” Through a “nexus
of contracts,” Coase argued, the firm operates to minimize such costs.
Legal obligations remove uncertainty, enable trust, and help to get the sand
out of the gears. All well and good, as far as it goes . . .
But debates around such legal mechanisms reflect an implicitly
mechanistic view of the firm, and this metaphor provides for far too
narrow a conceptualization of its nature. The firm is more than just
managers, shareholders, and some indistinct mass of interested
stakeholders. It is made up of people—more so now, in our “knowledge
economy,” than was the case at the time the Berle, Dodd, and Coase were
writing.173 Rather than “a nexus of contracts,” the firm must be seen as a
“nexus of relations,” as Mayer styles it. With Mayer, Fink observes that
the firm exists to enliven a purpose, and the nexus of relations among the
employees of a firm must work to facilitate consistent, coherent,
conscious, and collaborative effort in service of that purpose. Without
attention to the purpose of a firm, its governance is indeterminate, Mayer
argues. And what I have hoped to add here is that the governance of a firm
is equally indeterminate, or at least ineffectual, without a much fleshier
appreciation of employees than Homo economicus permits.

173. See Esko Kilpi, Complexity Revisited, MEDIUM (July 11, 2019), https://medium.com/
@EskoKilpi/complexity-revisited-31033d1c4038 [https://perma.cc/PQ6G-S5W8].
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Figure 2

As Dunbar has found, humans and all primates exist within nested
social worlds, with a few highly trusted peers at the center and with
decreasing levels of trust and emotional investment as we extend outwards
from there. This is true in the organizational context as well: individual
employees come together in clusters of highly trusted peers. These peer
trust networks often have little to do with the formal intended ordering of
the company as envisioned in organizational charts. Rather, they constitute
what has been called “the company behind the chart.”174
As in all human social orders, employees behave so as to maintain
in-group status with these trusted peers. The culture of a group is an
emergent property that arise from its complex interdependencies and
relational dynamics. Different communities of common character will
convene in any organization, and each will have its own normative dictates
for membership. As such, distinct sub-cultures will exist within the
organization, and the behavioral norms of those distinct communities may
and do regularly conflict.
Most critically for management, the purpose of these communities
may or may not be consistent with the stated mission, purpose, and values
of the organization within which they reside. Consider the example above
from the study of identity-priming among bank employees. Those who
were seen to engage in greater degrees of cheating when their identities
174. David Krackhardt & Jeffrey R. Hanson, Informal Networks: The Company Behind the
Chart, HARV. BUS. REV. (July–Aug. 1993), https://hbr.org/1993/07/informal-networks-the-companybehind-the-chart [https://perma.cc/E6R6-9FFZ].
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were “primed” were in front line roles. They were bankers. The same
increase in cheating was not seen to occur among back-office bank
employees. Same industry, same firms, but different communities,
different cultures, different behavior.
This reflects a hereditary trait of humans: “We are compulsively
driven to belong in groups or to create them as needed,” Wilson writes.
We regard our own group as superior, and “define our personal identities
as members within them.”175 We are thus evolutionarily wired such that
the pursuit of what we perceive to be personal desires or goals are, in fact,
more often goals that serve the community in which we reside and from
which our selfs are constituted. By operating through “illusions of
knowledge” and delusions of “apart-ness,” we mask from consciousness
the fact that most of our thoughts, decisions, and deeds operate in service
to others: the group. Ostracism, exclusion, banishment, expulsion of any
sort is existentially terrifying. “To be kept forcibly in solitude is to be kept
in pain, and put on the road to madness,”176 Wilson writes.
Resistance is futile. And failure to recognize this essential aspect of
human nature is perhaps the great shortcoming of orthodox economics. It
is why prevailing concepts of “utility maximization” fail to see identity as
a far more powerful utility than mere financial incentive. It is why
industry-standard methods of risk governance persistently fail to curb
culture and conduct related risk within firms. It is why $400 billion in
punitive fines for misconduct in the banking sector over the last decade
have not produced desired changes in behavior among employees at
individual firms. It is why trust in the sector has continued to erode.
Because its impact on society is so broad, an erosion of trust in the
financial sector has wide-ranging repercussions: consider the Financial
Crisis, pointed to by many as the proximate cause of the rancor that
characterizes daily discourse today.177 The restoration of trust in the
financial sector should thus be seen as a socio-political imperative as much
as an economic one. Such trust will not be restored until risk governance
methods succeed in putting an end to wide-spread misconduct. And risk
governance will fail until we embrace a fuller appreciation for Man’s
social nature.
Human behavior does not occur apart from the communities of
common character of which any individual forms but a part. Without this
understanding, the best we can ever do is to address symptoms of corporate
175. WILSON, supra note 76, at 25.
176. Id. at 30–31.
177. See, for instance, Joseph E. Stiglitz, In No One We Trust, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2013),
https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/in-no-one-we-trust/
[https://perma.cc/NT7CAAEF].
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malady. We must embrace the complexity of human systems if we wish
grapple with the underlying causal forces. “The tribal rules are what
matters,” argues renowned organizational psychologist Ed Schein, “That’s
where it’s really at. And that’s where leadership is. It’s in the group.”178
CONCLUSION
A. Coercive Competition
In a passionate piece entitled, Why is Economics not an Evolutionary
Science?,179 Thorstein Veblen argued in 1898 that the field of economics
was “in need of rehabilitation.”180 The discipline was “behind the times,”
and chiefly so for a failure to achieve what Wilson would later refer to as
consilience.181 The problem, for Veblen, was one of a “faulty conception
of human nature”182 on the part of the economists of his day, whose
theories relied upon Homo economicus—an isolated “human datum”—
leaving them blind to the fact that “the active material in which the
economic process goes on is the human material of the industrial
community.”183 Veblen summarizes much of what I have sought to convey
here in one neat passage:
The changes that take place in the mechanical contrivances are an
expression of changes in the human factor. Changes in the material
facts breed further change only through the human factor. It is in the
human material that the continuity of development is to be looked
for; and it is here, therefore, that the motor forces of the process of
economic development must be studied if they are to be studied in
action at all.184

It is “the human material” that constitutes the firm and provides “the
motor force” that drives its performance. It is therefore the human material
to which we must attend if we are to shape desired firm performance.
“Economic action is teleological,” Veblen argues.185 It reflects the
underlying purpose of economic actors (firms) and of those who make

178. See Egon Zehnder, In Conversation with Ed Schein: “Let’s Get to Know Each Other”,
EGON ZEHNDER (July 9, 2019), https://www.egonzehnder.com/insight/in-conversation-with-edschein [https://perma.cc/CTC2-HWCR].
179. Thorstein Veblen, Why is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?, 12 Q.J. ECON. 373, 373
(1898).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 389.
183. Id. at 387.
184. Id. at 388 (emphasis added).
185. Id. at 391.
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them up (human beings). “All economic change is a change in the
economic community,” Veblen concludes.186
It is time we heeded him. If we are to effectively manage and govern
the firm, we must start from this conception of the firm as a nexus, not just
of relations, but of relations between individuals interacting within
communities, and between distinct communities (“Superminds”)
interacting with one another within any given firm. Each community will
have its own set of behavioral norms—a culture—which will inform the
identity of its members. Compliance with these cultural dictates is
mandatory to maintained group membership. Thus, individual behavior is
shaped so as to promote the interests of the community, regardless of the
immediately apparent interests of a given community member.
Indeed, the imperative of normative compliance shapes the behavior
of individual actors so much so as to prompt behavior that is oftentimes
clearly contrary to individual economic self-interest. Individual interests,
goals, ambitions, preferences, desires, etc., may and do conflict with the
behavioral dictates of the community(-ies) within which an employee
operates. In such circumstances, it is community interests that most often
prevail. “Identity can account for many phenomena that current economics
cannot well explain,” writes Akerlof. This includes acting in ways that are
detrimental to our obvious individual well-being and which therefore
appear, at surface, to be irrational.187
Moreover, the cultural inclinations of a given community can and do
conflict with those of other communities within the same organization.
This includes the community of senior managers, that of “the C-suite,”
that of the board, and on up through to the broadest concept of the
“stakeholder community.” Each of these communities of interest will
assert normative force, but coercive energy dissipates the further we move
away from the center of a given employee’s most densely trusted peernetwork.188 What follows from this is that each employee becomes the
subject of a “coercive competition” between these distinct communities.
A simple graphic illustrates how an employee may operate when torn
between the cultural norms of two communities of personal relevance.

186. Id.
187. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, Economics and Identity, 115 Q.J. ECON. 715, 717
(2000).
188. See supra Figure 1.
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Figure 3: Starling Dynamic Culture Model

Let the Y-axis represent normative pressures from the “formal”
organization and the X-axis represent that from among more closely
trusted peers. Employees will be rewarded for compliance (and punished
for a lack of compliance) with normative dictates along either axis.189 How
an employee acts to balance these competing pressures produces four
possible outcomes in this admittedly overly simplistic model.
 Teacher’s Pet: The employee conforms to the normative dictates
of the formal organization and rejects those of his or her more
closely trusted peers. Other names commonly used to describe
this individual are “climber” and “ass-kisser.”
 Rogue Employee: The employee disregards the behavioral norms
insisted upon by both the formal organization and those of his or
her immediate peer group. Compliance personnel and those in
“surveillance and monitoring” functions typically focus their
resources here, in a hunt for the “malicious insider.”
 Model Citizen: When the normative dictates of both the formal
organization and those of one’s most closely trusted peers are
aligned, and an employee may act in concert with both and

189. See supra Figure 3.
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receive applause from both constituencies, we have the ideal
outcome.
The Cool Kids: When the normative dictates of the formal
organization conflict with those of one’s trusted peer group, the
disproportionately greater weighting we give to those within the
innermost of our Dunbar social circles drives us to conform to
our peers’ expectations at the expense of the formal organization.

Again, this is an overly simplistic model. It ignores, for instance, that
the employee belongs, not just to two, but to many “communities” within
the organization. The model fails to illustrate how coercive competition
plays out in that matrixed context. Nevertheless, it serves well enough to
illustrate the concluding point I wish to make with this Article.
I submit that the central task of those in risk governance roles is to
establish and maintain the broadest possible cultural coherence among
these distinct communities, conscientiously striving to minimize the
degree of coercive competition to which employees are subject. At a
minimum, they should seek to inquire intelligently into these dynamics.
To begin, one might start by seeking to create a scatter plot that posits
individual employees within each of the four quadrants in my model. The
shape of that graph alone provides actionable insights. For instance, the
graph below might signal a healthy firm with broad cultural cohesion (e.g.,
one might expect to see a graph like this in the Marine Corps).
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Figure 4

By contrast, a graph such as that below would seem to indicate a
company that is at war with itself (e.g., the proverbial “nerds” versus the
“jocks” in any given high school . . . ?).
Figure 5

One senior bank executive—the former COO of one of the world’s
leading firms—suggests in private discussions that the plot he would
expect to see would likely look more like the image immediately below.
(“The ‘cool kids’ are the ones that keep me up at night,” he remarked.)
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Figure 6

It is also important to keep in mind that these employees exist in
networks, which can also be illustrated in the following graphical form.

Figure 7
This is not unimportant, as Nicholas Christakis explains. “Consider
the metaphor of carbon atoms. Each is identical to the next but, grouped

802

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 43:765

together, different groupings have different properties. Assembled one
way, the atoms form graphite—dark and soft. Assembled differently, those
very same atoms form diamond—clear and hard. Group structure is
deterministic.”190 The same is true for the “structure” of social networks
within organizations: different structures yield different emergent
properties, such as normative dictates, or “culture.” This implies that both
social network structure and the social dynamics of cultural compulsion
warrant close scrutiny if we wish to anticipate, and shape, the
“mechanisms” of organizational performance.
Security expert Bruce Schneier lists four principal mechanisms for
inducing normative compliance in the organizational context, “coercive
mechanisms that induce people to cooperate, act in the group interest, and
follow group norms.”191
1. Institutional pressure, in the form of rules or laws that induce
compliant behavior through the threat of sanctions, operating
among the top two quadrants in my “coercive competition”
model above. It is here that we see the normative force of the
formal organization, typically expressed through the incentive
scheme and the compliance function at most organizations and
tested for through tick-box audit exercises.
2. Security systems, which are designed to catch bad actors,
“things that only work after the fact, like forensic and audit
systems.” This is the domain of surveillance and monitoring,
targeting the “rogue employee” in my model above. Though the
malicious insider can cause great harm, it should be noted that
only a very small percentage of the population are likely to
evince either the psychopathic or sociopathic tendencies
necessary to wholly reject the behavioral norms of both the
formal organization and those of one’s immediate peer group
(estimates are less than 5%192).
3. Moral pressure, which comes from “inside our own heads” and
which is therefore intimately tied up with considerations of selfidentity. It is here that we see an emphasis on “tone from the top”
and company codes of ethics, piously rehearsed at employee
190. Nicholas Christakis et al., A Copernican Revolution in Culture and Conduct Risk
Management, REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/bc-finreg-culture-conductrisk-managemen/a-copernican-revolution-in-culture-and-conduct-risk-management-idUSKB
N1KN2BR [https://perma.cc/E75B-YQTM].
191. BRUCE SCHNEIER, LIARS & OUTLIERS: ENABLING THE TRUST THAT SOCIETY NEEDS TO
THRIVE 7–9 (2012).
192. WILSON, supra note 76, at 179.
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town-hall meetings and reiterated through mandatory ethics
training programs, screened for in pre-employment
psychological surveys, and tested for subsequently through
employee engagement surveys. To the extent that it is effective
at all, this force is most likely found operating in the top-right
quadrant of my model.
4. Reputational pressure, which Schneier describes as “a wholly
different, and much stronger, type of pressure [that] comes from
how others respond to our actions.” This coercive mechanism
functions in the top-left quadrant (“Teacher’s Pet”) and in the
bottom-right quadrant (“The Cool Kids”). But, given what
Dunbar teaches us about the decreasing emotional force we
experience the farther we move from our social centers, it should
be clear that the coercive power of reputation in the top-left
quadrant is several orders of magnitude less than it is at the
bottom-right. As I have sought to argue throughout the entirety
of this Article, it is here that we find the greatest coercive force
in any human social order, to include the firm. And yet, at most,
it is managed through little more than “management intuition.”
Our failure to manage culture and conduct-related risks within
firms—in the financial sector and in most others as well—stems from a
failure to recognize the behavior-shaping force of coercive competition, to
appreciate that this reflects eons of evolutionary selective pressure that
defines the very nature of the human animal, and to conceive of the firm
as a nexus of relations across which these dynamics play out.
These ideas have macro-economic implications. “Because firms and
other organizations are the backbone of all economies,” Akerlof writes,
“[identity economics] transforms our understanding of what makes
economies work or fail.”193 And they have micro-economic implications
as well. “Once organizational networks can be measured, they can be
controlled,” Centola writes. “The most important implication here is that
managers can design organizational networks to provide a structural
foundation for accelerating the dynamics of change.”194 This will
necessarily involve illuminating the sources and dynamics of coercive
competition within a firm, and it is to this opportunity that we must now
turn our attention.

193. AKERLOF & KRANTON, supra note 139, at 15.
194. CENTOLA, supra note 161, at 130–31.
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B. Where to from Here?
MIT’s Tom Malone notes that no serious company would be run
without some accounting system that could track and consolidate
combined results across all of its disparate business units. “In the future,”
he writes, “it may become just as unthinkable to run a serious organization
that doesn’t do something similar with many other—much more
subjective—kinds of information. In fact,” he continues, “our greatgrandchildren may find it hard to understand how the organizations we
belong to in the early 21st century could have made so many of their
decisions with their eyes—figuratively—closed.”195
“As we continue to see the impact of technology and big data in other
parts of financial services, one interesting question is how innovation and
enhanced technology will support the measurement and management of
culture,” noted Kevin Stiroh, head of Supervision for the New York
Federal Reserve Bank, in a recent speech. “For example, we might see
firms routinely leverage broader data to make stronger predictions about
potential misconduct risk . . . .”196
New technologies in the realm of “computational social science”
offer much promise here.197 These tools allow us to map interpersonal trust
networks within organizations and to measure some of their behaviorshaping dynamics by sifting indicative—and predictive—signals from
within readily available company data sets, yielding heretofore
unavailable insights into the drivers of employee conduct.198
In an example of consilience that might please E. O. Wilson, these
social technologies have evolved from the application of computing power
in the natural sciences: computational social science is derived from earlier
work in the field of computational biology,199 which is at the root of many
astonishing achievements in genetic engineering.200 Perhaps what
computational biology permits for in the realm of “precision medicine”201

195. MALONE, supra note 71, at 222.
196. Kevin J. Stiroh, Executive Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
Reform of Culture in Finance from Multiple Perspectives, Remarks at the GARP Risk Convention,
New York City (Feb. 26, 2019) (transcript available at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
197. See generally IRiSS: Center for Computational Social Science, STAN. UNIV., https://iriss.
stanford.edu/css [https://perma.cc/ZP5S-5KBJ].
198. David Lazer, et al., Life in the Network: The Coming Age of Computational Social Science,
323 SCI. 721, 722 (2009).
199. Florian Markowetz, All Biology is Computational Biology, 15 PLOS BIOLOGY 1, 2–4
(2017).
200. See generally James T. Macdonald et al., Computational Design Approaches and Tools for
Synthetic Biology, 3 INTEGR. BIOL. 97 (2010).
201. See Kenneth S. Ramos et al., The Impact of Bioinformatics and Computational Biology in
Precision Medicine, in COMPREHENSIVE TOXICOLOGY 720, 728 (2018).
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might be mirrored in the field of computational social science, permitting
for “precision management”? Or, at least, “precision risk management.”
The power of such Computational Social Science techniques is
illustrated by recent research conducted at Stanford and Berkeley,202 where
researchers sought to determine whether firm culture could be shown to
be tied to specific performance outcomes and, if so, whether cultural
drivers of such outcomes might leave discernible artefacts in electronic
communications data such as email. “Organizational scholars have long
recognized the importance of culture in shaping individual, group, and
organizational success[,]”203 the researchers had observed, but
“compelling theoretical accounts of the dynamics of cultural fit and its
consequences remain largely absent from the literature.”204
In a novel approach, they looked at how new employees in an
organization demonstrate “normative compliance” by adopting the norms
for language use in email communications that prevail among their new
peers. The researchers identified and traced three distinct “encultration
trajectories” that correlated, with high predictive reliability, to specific
individual and organizational outcomes. Equipped with some 10 million
emails exchanged among 600 employees over a five-year period, and
human resource records that included things like employee age, gender,
tenure, and, for employees who had left the company, whether their
departure was voluntary or involuntary, the researchers found that email
language use among all new employees was initially out of step with
organizational norms. However, once those norms were learned, the study
discerned three common “signatures” within the data, which I will term
(1) “accept and adopt,” (2) “reject and eject,” and (3) “reject and defect.”
Employees showing the first “signature” in their electronic
communication patterns—that is, those who were “normatively
compliant”—were found to evince higher job satisfaction, motivation and
discretionary effort, greater attachment to the company and longer tenure,
as well as to deliver higher levels of both individual and firm performance
outcomes. And for the other two signatures? “Newcomers who do not
rapidly conform to cultural norms are rejected by their colleagues and
ultimately forced to exit,” the researchers found, “whereas those who had
successfully enculturated earlier in their careers but subsequently

202. Amir Goldberg et al., Enculturation Trajectories and Individual Attainment: An
Interactional Language Use Model of Cultural Dynamics in Organizations 17–20 (Institute for
Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper No. 107-16, 2016).
203. Id. at 1.
204. Id. at 2.
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exhibited a decline in cultural fit appeared to be detaching from the
organization and subsequently exited voluntarily.”205
Studies of this sort demonstrate the potential for computational social
science to transform how firms might investigate the cultural dynamics
and behavioral predispositions among their staff by making use of
commonly available and company-owned data sets. When adequately
informed by learnings from behavioral science, these tools may produce
deeply penetrative insights into the drivers of employee behavior and
organizational outcomes.
Companies in the regulatory technology, or “RegTech,” space are
making use of these methodologies to identify and mitigate behavioral
risks that are not sufficiently well captured by current standard metrics and
governance processes, promising to transform the corporate and risk
governance landscape. By illuminating the dynamics of coercive
competition, behavioral “early warning systems” position firm leaders to
intervene, proactively, with a view to encouraging desirable cultural and
conduct norms as well as to anticipating and curbing the spread of likely
behaviors inconsistent with a firm’s mission or values.
“The most beautiful as well as the most ugly inclinations of man are
not part of a fixed and biologically given human nature,” Fromm wrote,
“but result from the social process which creates man.”206 We must devise
a better means of enquiring into such processes.
By bringing quantitative metrics to the qualitative challenge of
human behavior, RegTech firms and other computational social science
pioneers can help management to assess culture and conduct risk to an
unprecedented degree, and perhaps to avoid unnecessary costs to
shareholders, customers, employees and society. In so doing, they may
help to restore trustworthiness to our critical social institutions.
This is the moral task of our time.

205. Id. at 18.
206. ERICH FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM 11 (1941).

